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John Ratliff
Abstract
On 1 May 2004, huge changes were introduced to the way in which EC compe-
tition law is enforced. The recent enlargement, with ten new EU Member States,
is probably the most important change, because it results in a scale change in the
size of the European Union. However, that change has also led to other important
changes: a reappraisal of how enforcement is spread across competition authori-
ties in the European Union and an effort to see whether other modernising steps
should be taken. Coincidentally, the EC Merger Control Regulation has also been
subject to a review mechanism and the related changes to this Regulation also
came into force on 1 May 2004. Taking the changes in the order of likely sig-
nificance to companies, the main changes are: (1) A revised EC Merger Control
Regulation came into force after an extensive review of the existing one, bring-
ing a new substantive test.1 (2) The modernising features of Council Regulation
1/20032 came into force, above all with the abolition of notifications to the Eu-
ropean Commission (the ‘Commission’) for clearance of agreements. (3) The
decentralisation aspects of Council Regulation 1/2003 came into force, above all
the shared enforcement of the whole of Article 81 of the EC Treaty (‘EC’) with
national competition authorities and national courts, meaning that they can also
apply Article 81(3) EC. (4) A further ten countries, including the Czech Republic,
joined the European Union,3 bringing new markets and opportunities for compe-
tition, an even greater breadth to the European Union and, as noted, a scale change
in how the European Union has to be organised.
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On 1 May 2004, huge changes were introducedto the way in which EC competition law is
enforced. The recent enlargement, with ten new EU
Member States, is probably the most important
change, because it results in a scale change in the
size of  the European Union. However, that change
has also led to other important changes: a
reappraisal of  how enforcement is spread across
competition authorities in the European Union and
an effort to see whether other modernising steps
should be taken. Coincidentally, the EC Merger
Control Regulation has also been subject to a review
mechanism and the related changes to this
Regulation also came into force on 1 May 2004.
Taking the changes in the order of  likely
significance to companies, the main changes are:
(1) A revised EC Merger Control Regulation came
into force after an extensive review of  the
existing one, bringing a new substantive test.1
(2) The modernising features of  Council Regulation
1/20032 came into force, above all with the
abolition of  notifications to the European
Commission (the ‘Commission’) for clearance of
agreements.
(3) The decentralisation aspects of  Council
Regulation 1/2003 came into force, above all the
shared enforcement of  the whole of  Article 81
of  the EC Treaty (‘EC’) with national
competition authorities and national courts,
meaning that they can also apply Article 81(3)
EC.
(4) A further ten countries, including the Czech
Republic, joined the European Union,3 bringing
new markets and opportunities for competition,
an even greater breadth to the European Union
and, as noted, a scale change in how the
European Union has to be organised.
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These four aspects will now be outlined in turn,
focusing on the main impact in the Czech Republic
(although similar points apply for all the accession
countries).
EC merger control after May 2004
Case allocation
After 1 May 2004, since the Czech Republic is part
of  the European Union, if  a merger or acquisition
has a ‘Community dimension’, generally the
consequences for the Czech market will be decided
in Brussels by the Commission.
In practice, this means that when multinational
companies are making acquisitions which involve
assets in the Czech Republic, they will no longer be
thinking of  parallel filings with the Commission
and with the Office for the Protection of
Competition (the ‘Competition Office’) (among
others). Instead, they will be making one filing in
Brussels, giving a ‘one-stop-shop’ clearance for what
will then be 25 countries in the European Union and
28 countries, including the members of  the
European Economic Area (EEA).
It would be misleading to think that the
Competition Office in Brno will not be involved at
all in these cases, since the Office will participate in
the EU Member States Advisory Committee which
is part of  the EC merger control procedure. Beyond
this, there is often a degree of  informal cooperation
between the Commission and those Member States
which have particular knowledge of  relevant
markets that are affected. The Commission can also
refer Community dimension cases to the
Competition Office in Brno for review under Czech
law, if  there are likely effects on a distinct Czech
market. Under Council Regulation 139/2004, this
can take place either before or after a notification is
made to the Commission.4 The sorts of  case under
consideration here are those where the impact on
competition is on a local market, eg where there
might be a pipeline system in only part of  a country
or a localised supermarket or petrol station overlaps.
Nevertheless, this is a major change with rulings
on competition in the Czech market being made in
Brussels as part of  the overall EU- or EEA-wide
clearance.
After 1 May 2004, some also argue that the Czech
market will be reviewed more often for two reasons:
first, because information on Czech markets will
have to be provided as part of  the Commission filing
even if  they are not the focus of  competitive
concern. Secondly, some argue that where there are
many filings worldwide, some companies are
reluctant to file in small jurisdictions unless there is
a clear overlap and the parties have assets in that
jurisdiction. This is hard to judge, but what is clear
is that the issue should no longer arise after Czech
entry to the European Union because compliance
with EU filing requirements is more generally
accepted. (Mainly, in view of  its economical ‘one-
stop-shop’ benefit in covering many countries at
once and the seriousness of  a failure to comply.)
In practice, it is likely that more merger cases will
go to Brussels to be reviewed by the Commission
simply because it may be easier to meet the
Community dimension test in the EC Merger
Control Regulation. It may be recalled that this can
be done in two ways5:
(1) The first involves an assessment of  the
worldwide turnover of  both companies together
and the EU-wide turnover of  each undertaking
involved separately. If  certain thresholds are met
and the two companies do not have more than
66 per cent of  their turnover in the European
Union in the same Member State then the case
goes to the Commission.
(2) The second involves looking at lower thresholds
and the spread of  impact across the Community
resulting from the transaction. Again, the
worldwide turnover of  the companies together
will be looked at (a lower figure than under the
first rule) and then there will be a consideration
of  whether each company has more than a
certain amount of  EU turnover. In addition,
there will be an examination of  whether the
parties have defined levels of  turnover in at least
three Member States together and separately.6
With 25 EU members, it is likely that more cases
will meet these thresholds than was the case with
only 15 EU members, whether one looks at the
overall financial amounts or the point that in the
second version of  the Community dimension test,
at least three Member States have to be affected.
In addition, from 1 May 2004, there is a new
ability for companies to ask for a case to be dealt
with by the Commission in Brussels if  at least three
national filings are required in the European
Union.7 However, since we are dealing here with
cases where the Community dimension test has not
been met, the Member States in question can still
object to central treatment of  the case in Brussels
and insist that the national filings be made, with
local decisions in each case. It remains to be seen if
this will be an attractive option to companies or
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whether they will prefer to make the national filings
in any event.
There will continue to be many merger cases
dealt with at national level in the Competition
Office. This will be where national procedures apply,
under the level of  the Community dimension test, if
the national filing thresholds are met.8
Substantive tests
Turning to substantive review in merger control,
there are two main points to emphasise. First, as one
widens the geographical scope of  the EU market, it
may be expected that there will be more of  a
tendency to find lesser markets than the whole of
the European Union. In particular, experience
suggests that there may be some regional markets,
whether combining parts of  the ‘old EU’ with the
‘new EU’ (such as a market comprising Austria, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Germany), or
involving just the more Central European countries
(eg perhaps Poland, Russia, the Baltic States,
Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Germany).
Geographical market definition is therefore an
area in which we will have to continue to be very
careful in our assessments. It will not always be the
case that regional (or national) markets will exist,
because the countries that joined the European
Union on 1 May are in many cases already part of  a
general European market. There may also be a
dynamic tendency towards a full European market
as the new acceding countries become more fully
integrated with the old. However, the distances
between, eg, Prague and Lisbon, and the differences
between the various regions may speak to market
differentiation in some cases.
Secondly, there may be some important
substantive variations between EU and Czech
merger control review. As of  1 May 2004, the
Commission applies a new so-called ‘SIEC test’. The
letters SIEC stand for ‘significant impediment to
effective competition’, in particular through the
creation of  single or collective dominance.9 The
important point is that the new EC merger test is
not only concerned with an assessment of
dominance but can also include anti-competitive
effects of  non-coordinated behaviour of  non-
dominant companies.
The sort of  issue which this is designed to address
is where, eg, a merger involves the second and third
players in a market whose products are close
substitutes. Even though the merger may not result
in single firm dominance, there could be the
creation or strengthening of  a collective dominant
position. Where the particular conditions for that do
not apply10 and yet the acquisition will give the
ability to players in the market independently to
raise prices, it has been suggested that there is an
anti-competitive effect against which the
Commission should be able to intervene.
This is new, complex and controversial since the
previous ‘dominance’ based test was fairly easy for
companies to grasp and accept. The new, wider test
may well lead to uncertainty as to which cases will
be problematic, at least for a few years while the
system is established. The SIEC test also extends the
possible scope of  the Commission’s intervention in a
way that many do not like. Nevertheless, from 1
May 2004, it is the EC legal standard.
The Czech review is somewhat simpler at present,
in line with the position in most of the EU Member
States. It focuses rather on an aspect that is included
in the SIEC test but is narrower than this test. In
other words, the issue is whether a merger or
acquisition creates or strengthens a dominant
position in the Czech Republic. In general, it will be
interesting to see whether all the Member States
choose to switch to the EC test in order to increase
cohesion, or whether some will continue to apply the
simpler dominance test.
Modernisation
For some years now, the Commission has been
modernising the EC competition rules. What this
means in practice is essentially two things:
(1) The Commission has sought to focus on
restrictions on competition by those with market
power or involving more significant effects, with
a greater emphasis on economic assessments
than previously.
(2) The Commission has been modernising its
legislation to fit a system with no notifications
for ‘exemption’, since from May 2004 this is
abolished.
Block exemption ‘ceilings’
The modernisation process has been reflected in
amendments to the general block exemptions on
issues such as vertical restraints and transfer of
technology licensing, so that they are only available
up to a certain market share ‘ceilings’.11 Generally,
for vertical restraints, the ceiling is a 30 per cent
share for the supplier on the market on which it sells
the relevant goods or services. In the Commission’s
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new block exemption for technology transfer
agreements, which entered into force on 1 May
2004, the ceilings are a 20 per cent share of  the
relevant technology or product market, held by the
parties together in the case of  licensing between
competitors, and a 30 per cent market share held by
either party in the case of  licensing between non-
competitors.
If  agreements do not have certain so-called
‘black-listed’ or ‘hard core’ (serious) restrictions and
the market shares of  the parties concerned are
under certain of  these ceilings, then the block
exemption can be relied on as a safe harbour for the
legality of  the relevant agreement and the
restrictive clauses therein.
If, on the other hand, these market share ceilings
are exceeded, a more specific review is required and
the restrictions may have to be amended, above all to
give further openings to the market. A recent
example of  this in Belgium involved the Interbrew
company, which had to amend its beer supply
contracts to various outlets so as to give more
openings to the market.12
The overall theme is therefore clear: under
modernisation there will be more limits to block
exemptions where large market shares are involved
and, above those exemptions, more specific and
demanding assessments and solutions may be
required. Against this, one may note that both the
vertical restraints and technology transfer block
exemptions should be wider in scope. This should
leave the focus of  enforcement in more relevant
areas, ie the significant restrictions where there is
market power.
Abolition of  notification
The other main change associated with
modernisation is the abolition of  the notification
system to the Commission.
For many years, it has been possible to review
agreements and, if  an agreement involves
restrictions not covered by a block exemption, then,
where a high level of  legal certainty was sought, a
notification could be made to the Commission
seeking exemption under Article 83(3) EC. Such
notification also gives immunity against fines for the
practices concerned. The idea of  notification was
then to obtain a full exemption decision, stating that
a restrictive agreement or practice was lawful for a
stated time, or at least a so-called ‘comfort letter’
indicating that the Commission had no objection to
the restrictions concerned.
On 1 May 2004, this changed dramatically insofar
as such notifications are no longer possible.
Companies are not able to obtain immunity in this
way, nor decisions of  this type and will have to assess
for themselves whether their agreements can be
justified. They will also have to be prepared to
defend their assessments before the Commission,
national competition authorities and in the national
courts.
The Commission has indicated that it is prepared
to give informal guidance in the form of  a written
statement (so-called ‘guidance letters’) with regard
to novel questions and has issued a notice on this
practice.13 However, this is not meant to be
notification ‘by the back door’. The procedure is
meant to apply to ‘genuinely unresolved’ questions
and therefore to be of  limited application.
The focus on economic assessments is therefore
generally welcome. However, it has been at a price
in terms of  legal certainty. The introduction of  more
market share ceilings to block exemptions means
that there is more insecurity for companies as to the
solutions required across Europe. For example, if  the
relevant market for supply of  a product is European,
then one approach can be taken for Europe as a
whole. If, on the other hand, there are national or
regional markets with variations in market positions
and market power, then corresponding variations
may be required to the agreements to reflect these
factual variations. There may also still be national
notification requirements, although it is understood
that the proposed amendment to Czech law will
remove this.
There may also be more insecurity insofar as
there will no longer be exemptions for a given
period of  time. It remains to be seen for how long
clearance decisions will be effective, given the risk
that plaintiffs may seek their review and may not be
clearly prevented from doing so as with a formal
exemption decision.
In general, with the abolition of  the notification
system, it is expected that the Commission will be
more active with investigations started on its own
initiative, whether into specific practices or on a
sectoral basis. It will be interesting to see if  the
Competition Office takes a similar approach if  the
notification system is removed, giving the Office a
greater ability to define its investigating priorities.
Decentralisation
Decentralisation is also a dramatic change in the
way that the competition rules are enforced.
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Application of  Article 81(3) EC by national
competition authorities and courts
For years we have been used to the idea that Article
81(3) EC can only be applied by the Commission.
When Council Regulation 1/2003 entered into force
on 1 May 2004, together with the principles of
direct effect of  Articles 81 and 82 EC, for the first
time national competition authorities such as the
Competition Office, the Commission and any
national court are able to rule on Article 81(3) EC.
This is an issue of  great interest, because it may
well lead national competition authorities to be
more active in targeting restrictions that they did
not look at before. Many national competition
authorities used to look only at restrictions with
clear national effect, not affecting trade between EU
Member States, partly for jurisdictional reasons and
partly because they only had exemption powers
under their national laws, not EC law. This now
changes so they may be active on a wider range of
restrictions.
However, there is also some trepidation because it
is thought that Article 81(3) EC involves a complex
economic assessment. As a result, many practitioners
are pushing for specialised national competition
courts. Without any criticism of  ordinary judges, it
is simply thought that procedures will be more
effective (and cheaper) if  the judges involved are
more regularly concerned with such economic
assessments. At the moment, these issues could arise
in front of  any court, however low it is in the overall
hierarchy and (almost) no matter what is the court’s
daily work, since competition issues can have a wide
reach.
Otherwise, practitioners are thinking that the
advice required of  them after this change may also
have to be somewhat different. Until now the
tendency has been to assess closely the enforcement
practice of  the Commission in a certain field and to
have a very focused understanding as to what is
likely to be allowed or not. Such assessments may be
more difficult in the future, if  the test is whether
any competition authority or court dealing with the
case would find an infringement or would be likely
to apply Article 81(3) EC. It is likely to be a more
general assessment than taking a view on whether
Brno or Brussels would accept a certain situation in
the circumstances.
Nevertheless, the Commission will still be key on
the big issues, for the declaratory decisions (which
only it can take and which are specifically designed
to clarify the position on certain types of  new or
important practice14 ) and also because of  the
principles confirmed in the European Court’s
Masterfoods judgment.15 In short, this judgment
requires that national authorities and courts must
not take decisions which run counter to a
Commission decision or are likely to run counter to
a Commission decision in proceedings on the same
issue or matter. Moreover, if  a national competition
authority were not to follow agreed EC competition
law, it appears that the Commission could pull
a case to Brussels16 (although clearly that is likely
to be the exception and would be no doubt
controversial).
Enforcement coordination
Under Regulation 1/2003, there are structures for
coordination between the Commission and the
national competition authorities involving the
transfer of  cases and related files and the exchange
of  confidential information.17 All this is very radical
when one looks back at how little was allowed
before,18 but clearly it is essential if  there is to be an
adequately cohesive, yet decentralised enforcement
system.
Similarly, there are parallel but different
cooperation procedures as regards the Commission
and the national courts.19 The Commission is
informed of  judgments involving competition issues
and can provide written observations in some
circumstances, as can the national competition
authority, in this case the Competition Office in
Brno. If  a court allows it, representatives of  the
Commission may also act as a form of  amicus curiae
in explaining orally how the principles of
competition law may apply to a given dispute.
The enforcement concept is one of  a European
Competition Network (ECN), with the Commission
at the centre, but national competition authorities
fully involved. Again, one can only say how
dramatically this has all changed in recent years.
Not that long ago there were few competition
authorities in the European Union and only some of
those, such as the Bundeskartellamt in Germany,
were very active. Now, there are important and
effective competition authorities in many EU
Member States, taking many decisions, producing
new thinking on issues and influencing Brussels and
each other in the process.
After 1 May 2004, a competition case can be dealt
with in Brno or Brussels or handled by several
national competition authorities or arise before a
national court.
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According to the principles of  work-sharing in
the notice on cooperation between the Commission
and national competition authorities, it is likely that
those cases with their main competitive impact in
the Czech Republic will be dealt with by the
Competition Office, since the Office in the Czech
Republic should be best placed to deal with them,
unless a special principle or precedent is involved, in
which case the matter may be dealt with by the
Commission.
On the other hand, if  three or more EU Member
States are affected by a restriction, the case is likely
to be handled in Brussels. In between, there may be
joint action by national competition authorities.
This may become a developing area. For example,
it may be of  interest to note that the Nordic
competition authorities often appear to work
together and have signed an official agreement on
such procedures. It may be that in the years to come
interventions by, eg, the Austrian and Czech
authorities or the Czech and Slovak authorities
together should be expected.
Under the new decentralised system, the Czech
authorities, whether the Competition Office in Brno
or national courts, must apply EC competition law if
there is an effect on trade between Member States.
This concept is interpreted very widely, so that in
practice the application of  EC competition law may
often occur.
This process should also have a harmonising
effect on national competition law, since the scope
for applying EC law is very wide and, where EC and
national competition law is applied in parallel, on
Article 81 EC issues there should be no divergent
outcomes. (However, Member States can apply
stricter rules on dominance issues.20 )
If  the national courts are uncertain as to the
interpretation of  EC competition law, they can
always refer a question to the European Court of
Justice in Luxembourg.
Finally, it should be emphasised that in applying
EC competition law, the Czech authorities will
follow the Czech procedural rules.
Accession/enlargement
Commission investigations
After 1 May 2004, as a result of  Czech entry into the
European Union, the Commission is able to
intervene directly in the Czech Republic, with so-
called ‘dawn raids’, usually meaning inspections on
company premises and new powers to carry out such
inspections, even in private homes.21 Clearly this is
controversial, but reflects concerns about cartel
documents being kept at home. One may think that
the Commission will only use this right to enter
private homes in very clear cases and there are
various restrictions on it doing so.
However, the point is clear that after 1 May 2004
the Commission is able to carry out such
investigations on Czech soil. (It is understood that
there is also an amendment proposed to the Czech
competition law to give the Competition Office
similar powers.)
Likely enforcement priorities
In general, there are likely to be some interventions
by the Commission in the early years but not too
many. The ECN involves a concept of
decentralisation of  enforcement that should mean
that the Commission would leave much to the
Competition Office. The Commission may also allow
some time for transition on Czech entry to the
European Union.
However, this may not apply if  there are big
issues at stake or major complaints. As a practical
matter, it would not be surprising to see the
Commission intervene if  it saw companies which it
thought should know better, since they are operating
extensively in the ‘old European Union’, infringing
the rules in the ‘new EU’ Member States. Clearly,
sooner or later the Commission will be keen to
ensure that the message has got through that full
compliance with the EC competition rules in the
new accession states is also required.
It is also important to realise that there should be
more focus on restrictions on trade and competition
between the Czech Republic and the other accession
countries and on restrictions between the Czech
Republic and the old 15 EU Member States. Until
May 2004, there was a possibility to address the
latter restrictions under the Europe Agreement.22
However, in practice it is thought that this provision
was little used. Now we expect such restrictions to be
more directly addressed.
A focus on the more serious restrictions can also
be expected, in other words cartels, restrictions on
parallel imports, collective action to hinder foreign
entry and the former monopolies and oligopolies
that came about through privatisation and still hold
dominant positions.
This will give new remedies to companies against
restrictions in the Czech Republic, or the ‘old EU’
Member States, or the ‘new EU’ Member States. In
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other words, if  Czech companies find that it is
difficult to obtain access to some of  the existing
markets of  the European Union, or in other
accession countries, they will now have at least three
ways in which they can tackle the issue: they can go
to the Commission in Brussels and complain, or they
can go to the Competition Office in Brno and
complain, or they can go before the national courts.
State aid
Finally, there will be major issues on state aid after
accession. There are already a number of  cases
running concerning pre-accession aid where it is
argued that the aid will have effects after accession
which can and should be reviewed (eg the current
Czech banking cases).23 After accession, enforcement
of  the state aid rules is in Brussels with the
Commission. All new aid is also to be subject to
Brussels review. It is understood that the
Competition Office in Brno will retain a monitoring
role as regards state aid, but will no longer take
actual decisions in relation thereto.
Conclusion
All this adds up to a tremendous amount of  change
on 1 May 2004. It may lead to a fair amount of
uncertainty and turmoil as people adapt to the new
system. However, it is undoubtedly a necessary
evolution given the new scale of  the enlarged
European Union and an exciting and welcome
prospect.
The key for those in the Czech Republic (and the
other countries joining the European Union) is to
remember the sort of  advice which various ‘old EU’
Member States have given to their companies during
the evolution of  the Common Market, above all in
1992, ie to take advantage of  the EU market and be
active in it, since it is a market. If  you do not and
others compete harder, you may suffer. If  you do
take part, it provides a great opportunity.
Finally, EC competition law has become more
modern, giving plenty of  scope for arguments to
justify business practices driven by valid concerns.
It is only as regards the classic infringements that
enforcement has become tougher. In short, one
should not assume too quickly that restrictive
practices are unlawful. Often there are justifications
that can be put forward to persuade the authorities
to allow them. 
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